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ARGUMENT
POINT I
OLSEN'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THE RELEVANT STATUTORY CRITERIA HAS NOT BEEN WAIVED
The State argues that Olsen has waived any claim that the
trial court committed reversible error by failing to consider all
relevant statutory criteria, and by failing to make its reasons
for its award of restitution part of the record, because Olsen
did not adequately raise these issues in the trial court and
because the appellate record is incomplete (Br. of Appellee at
11-15).

Olsen disagrees.

One, the scheduling of a restitution hearing itself clearly
places before the trial court the statutory requirements as set
forth in Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-3-201(4) & (8) surrounding
such an award of restitution.

In awards of restitution, as with

the imposition of most criminal penalties, it is the
responsibility of the trial court to apply the law to the facts.

1

Cf.,

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 771-72 (Utah 1985) (Waiver

of punitive damage claim arising out of instruction to the jury).
Moreover, in this case the trial court did not allow in this
case a contemporaneous objection to his application of law to
fact.

At the close of the restitution hearing the trial judge,

who was late for a meeting, simply took the matter under
advisement (R. 116, 121-22).

Cf.,

State v. Bvwater, 748 P.2d

568, 569 (Utah 1987) (Waiver of claim for failure to object when
trial court issued the sentence orally at conclusion of
sentencing proceeding).

Later the trial court issued a written

restitution order, which failed to consider all relevant factors,
and which failed to make the reasons for the decision a part of
the court record.

See, Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-3-201(4) & (8);

Brief of Appellant at 8-10.
Two, the appellate record is adequate for this Court to rule
on the issues before it.

The State is correct that the appellate

record does not contain the presentence report.

However, the

report itself—and whether or not it contained information
pertaining to Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201(4)(c)—is not
relevant to the issues before this Court.

What is relevant in

this case is the fact that the trial court "received and
considered" the report prior to the imposition of probation on
May 31, 1995, which took place a week before the order of
restitution was made (R. 27). What is at issue here is not the
statutory criteria, but the trial court's failure to demonstrate
that all relevant statutory criteria had been considered and the
2

trial court's failure to make its reasons for the award of
restitution a part of the record.
The State is also correct that the appellate record does not
include a transcript of the sentencing hearing conducted on May
31f 1996.

However, the reason it was not requested is because it

is not relevant to the issues of restitution before this Court.
Restitution was not "determined" at that sentencing hearing (R.
26); and a subsequent restitution hearing was conducted on June
8, 1996—a transcript of which is included in the appellate
record (R. 46-123).
Because Olsen has not waived the errors he claims on appeal,
he respectfully asks this Court to consider the issues raised and
to reverse the trial court's restitution order.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ITS ORDER OF RESTITUTION
The State claims that the trial court's factual findings
concerning the amount of restitution are not clearly erroneous,
and therefore, the trial court's award of restitution should be
affirmed (Br. of Appellee at 15-19 (citations omitted)).

Olsen

disagrees.
As noted by the State, evidence in support of an award of
damages must be reasonable, and must "rise above speculation"
(Br. of Appellee at 17). Here, however, the trial court's award
of restitution was based upon speculative and unreasonable
estimates.

3

One, at the restitution hearing, Richard Wright, the victim,
testified that cash and change totalling approximately $800 was
taken from two coffee cans (R. 28, 57). However, Wright admitted
that the $800 figure was nothing more than an estimate and that
he had never counted the money in the cans nor did he have an
inventory list (R. 57, 77). Yet, the trial court ordered Olsen
to pay Wright $800 for the money in the cans.
Two, Wright testified that antique coins were taken which
had a value of $13,500.50 (R. 28, 29, 60). But the only actual
valuation or inventory of the coin collection was done by Wright
and his son approximately fifteen years previous and that the
coins had not been touched since (R. 60, 62, 63, 80-81 J.1

Again

the trial court, based solely upon Wright's speculative estimate
of replacement costs, ordered Olsen to pay $13,500.50 for the
coins—coins which Wright had not seen in fifteen years.
Three, the trial court ordered that Olsen pay $4500 for
monies taken from a wallet based upon a "note" found by Wright in
the storage room after the burglary (R. 28, 55-56, 58-59).
However, this award is speculative and unreasonable because
Wright testified that the note was probably written in 1979 (R.
73-74) and that since 1979 he had taken money from the room

Although Wright testified that in preparation for the
restitution hearing "he called a guy that dealt with coins" who
gave him a conservative estimate on the phone, that estimate is
still speculative because it was conducted on the phone and
concerned only an inventory list that had been compiled over
fifteen years previous.
4

approximately twice but that he did not remember how much he took
or from what location (R. 74-75).
In addition, Wright testified that 1988 was the only time he
ever made a complete inventory list of what property was kept in
the storage room (R. 71) although he also testified that in 1989
he "counted it" and "came up with... $22,090" (R. 75).
Olsen asserts that the trial court "abused its discretion"
in ordering Olsen to pay the full-value of Wright's "estimates"—
particularly in light of Olsen's testimony that all but
approximately $1500-2000 of the money taken was recovered by the
sheriff's department (R. 101-102).

Wright's estimates were

speculative, unreasonable, and based upon evidence of inventories
taken by him anywhere from six to sixteen years previous.
Therefore, Olsen asks this Court to vacate the trial court's
order of restitution and to remand the matter to the trial court
for reconsideration of the question of restitution.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the trial court's failure to consider all legally
relevant factors and its failure to make the reasons for the
award part of the record, and based upon the fact that the
restitution order was based upon unreasonably speculative
evidence, Olsen asks this court to vacate the order of
restitution and to remand the case for reconsideration of the
question of restitution.
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DATED this

/-7
! 7) day of May, 1996.

/y
^

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Olsen
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